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Yours, Mine and Ours: A Proposal to Bring  
Certainty to the Use of Personal Goodwill in 
the Sale of Assets of a C Corporation 
 
 





Since the seminal case of Martin Ice Cream1 in 1998, certain 
shareholders of closely held2 C corporations3 have had the opportunity to 
avoid, in part, double taxation4 on the sale of their corporation’s assets by 
allocating some or all of the purchase price to “personal goodwill,” i.e., 
goodwill owned personally by the shareholder rather than by the 
corporation.  Both the corporation and the shareholder benefit from this 
allocation: first, the corporation will be able to report less in proceeds, 
which then reduces the amount of taxes it will pay on the sale.5  Second, 
the shareholder will have long term capital gains treatment6 on the proceeds 
without the proceeds first being subjected to a corporate tax.  The buyer has 
no dog in this hunt–it will amortize the goodwill over 15 years regardless 
 
 * Tax and Business Attorney, San Carlos, Calif., and Adjunct Lecturer at University of Santa 
Clara, School of Law 
 1. Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 189 (1998). 
 2. “Closely held” does not necessarily mean that the business is small in revenue or net worth.  It 
only means that there are very few owners.  As of 2012, the most recent year for which we have data, 
41% of all businesses in the United States had only one owner.  www.census.gov/econ/sbo/. 
 3. Section 1361(a)(2) of the Code defines a “C corporation” as “a corporation which is not an S 
corporation.”  I.R.C. § 1361(a)(2).  In other words, a C corporation is the default setting for 
corporations. 
 4. “Double taxation” is the idea that a corporation is first taxed on the proceeds it receives in a 
transaction, and then the shareholders are taxed on the net proceeds they receive from the corporation.  
For example, assume a corporation is selling assets for $100,000, which assets have a basis of $30,000.  
The net proceeds to the corporation are $70,000.  Assuming a corporate tax rate of 35%, the corporation 
will pay $24,500 in taxes, and then will distribute out the remainder as a dividend ($45,500) to its 
shareholder.  Assuming a dividend tax rate of 20%, its shareholder will pay $9,100 in taxes, leaving its 
shareholder with a net $36,400.  See also Part II.B, infra. 
 5. In addition, corporations do not receive the benefit of long term capital gains treatment that are 
enjoyed by individuals.  All proceeds are taxed as ordinary income.  I.R.C. § 11. 
 6. This assumes that the shareholder has owned their stake in this company for at least a year, 
which would normally be the case given the criteria for allocating personal goodwill. 
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of from whom it was purchased. 7 
The problem with allocating proceeds to personal goodwill is that it is 
not risk free. Despite case law8 and commentary9 that show a generally 
understood list of criteria10 necessary for a seller to take advantage of an 
allocation of personal goodwill, its promotion always comes with caveats: 
the Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”) does not like it,11 following 
the criteria just reduces the risk of it being respected by the Service,12 and 
the criteria aren’t foolproof – they’re just a good defense from a Service 
challenge,13 just to name a few.  Added to that problem is that the criteria 
are not as carved in stone as some of the commentators seem to assert; 
rather, these cases are covered in a patina of judges’ feelings about personal 
goodwill or the behavior of the litigants. 
This article examines in depth the individual cases that came after and 
relied on Martin Ice Cream, and then challenges the criteria that others 
have determined have been suggested by those cases.  Last, this article 
suggests a legislative fix (similar to the problem that section 197 was 
created to fix)14 to make clear the criteria for allocation of personal 
goodwill, which would reduce litigation and give certainty in this area of 
law. 
 
II. GOODWILL – BACKGROUND 
 
A. WHAT IS GOODWILL? 
 
To understand personal goodwill, an understanding of goodwill, by 
itself, is important.  Goodwill is an intangible asset of a business15  that 
 
 7. I.R.C. § 197. 
 8. See Part IV, infra. 
 9. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property 
in Corporate Acquisitions, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2005); Bret Wells & Craig Bergez, Disposable 
Personal Goodwill, Frosty the Snowman, and Martin Ice Cream All Melt Away in the Bright Sunlight of 
Analysis, 91 NEB. L. REV. 170 (2012). 
 10. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Risius & Aaron Stumpf, Another Tax Court Case Addresses the Question 
of Whether Identified Intangible Value Is Business Goodwill or Personal Goodwill, SRR JOURNAL, last 
accessed Sept. 4, 2016, http://www.srr.com/article/another-tax-court-case-addresses-question-whether-
identified-intangible-value-business-goodw. 
 11. Peter J. Reilly, Personal Goodwill Avoids Corporate Tax Exposure, FORBES, June 13, 2014, 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2014/06/13/personal-goodwill-avoids-corporate-tax-
exposure/# 3cb0 de6321b4. 
 12. Timothy M. Todd, Whose Goodwill Is It? The Taxation of Goodwill in Owner-Entity 
Transactions, 122 J. TAX'N 74, 81 (2015). 
 13. Nick Gruidl, Amy Kasden & Peter Enyart, Personal Goodwill: Alive and Well Indeed!, TAX 
ADVISER, March 31, 2015, http://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2015/apr/tax-clinic-07.html. 
 14. Jack S. Levin & Donald E. Rocap, A Transactional Guide to New Code Section 197, TAX 
NOTES, Oct. 25, 1993, at 474.  See Part III, infra. 
 15. An intangible asset is a non-physical asset that has value. It “derives its value not from physical 
attributes, but from its intellectual content or other intangible properties.”  I.R.M. 4.48.5.1. 
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comes into existence when the assets of a company are being purchased.16  
In its simplest terms, goodwill is the difference between the purchase price 
of all of a company’s assets and the fair market value of a company’s 
tangible assets.17  For example, if Company A purchased the assets of 
Company B for $500,000, yet the fair market value of only the tangible 
assets18 was $400,000, the remaining $100,000 would be allocated to 
goodwill.19  The meaning behind an allocation of goodwill to part of a 
purchase price of assets is that the goodwill has value: it is “the value of a 
trade or business attributable to the expectancy of continued customer 
patronage.  This expectancy may be due to the name or reputation of a 
trade or business or any other factor.”20  However, this definition is 
statutorily fairly new, having been enacted only in 2000, in a regulation 
under section 197.21  Section 197 itself was only enacted in 1993.22  Prior to 
2000, goodwill was not otherwise defined in the United States Code, 
including the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”),23 nor in any other 
United States regulation.24  Commentators frequently noted the lack of a 
definition.25 
But courts and professionals had defined goodwill prior to 2000–the 
concept has been used for accounting purposes since at least 1874,26 for 
legal and tax purposes at least since 189327 and as a part of the value of a 
professional business in a division of marital assets at least since 1956.28,29 
 
 16. The concept is also used in the divorce context when valuing the assets of a business for the 
division of property.  Goodwill as used in that context is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 17. ROBERT B. DICKIE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS AND BUSINESS VALUATION FOR THE 
PRACTICAL LAWYER 72 (2d ed. 2006). 
 18. Tangible assets are physical assets, and can be further broken down between fixed assets (e.g., 
buildings, machinery) and current assets (e.g., inventory). 
 19. The excess of purchase price over fair market value can also be allocated to other intangible 
assets, provided that those assets are capable of being separated from the business itself, e.g., a patent. 
See text accompanying note 73, infra.  However, the generic definition stated above is the most used 
and commonly understood definition. 
 20. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1). 
 21. Id. 
 22. I.R.C. § 197. 
 23. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555 (1993). 
 24. All definitions of goodwill in the regulations refer to Regulation section 1.197-2(b)(1).  See, 
e.g., Reg. 1.263(a)-4(c)(1)(x). 
 25. See Matthew A. Melone, Section 197 Complicates Planning for Retiring LLC Members, 58 
TAX'N FOR ACCT. 292, 297 (1997) (“Admittedly, precise definitions of goodwill are elusive, as 
evidenced by the regulations under sections 338 and 1060.  These regulations, governing the allocation 
of purchase price among multiple assets, define goodwill residually as the amount left over after 
allocation of amounts to all other assets, which, of course, just begs the question of what exactly is 
goodwill.”). 
 26. HUGH P. HUGHES, GOODWILL IN ACCOUNTING: A HISTORY OF THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 
(1982). 
 27. Metro. Nat'l Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 448 (1893). 
 28. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 250 (1956). 
 29. 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce & Separation § 547 (2016).  In this context, the value of goodwill can 
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B. TAX CONSEQUENCES FOR A C CORPORATION30 SELLER OF ASSETS 
GENERALLY 
 
When a C corporation sells its assets, the profit it makes on the sale is 
taxed to the corporation (as opposed to the individual shareholders).  The 
rate of corporate income tax ranges between 15% and 39%.31  The 
profit remaining after the payment of taxes is then available for distribution 
to the shareholders. After distribution to the shareholders, the shareholders 
are taxed on that distribution at their individual income tax rates.  This is 
the idea of double taxation32 in a nutshell: the corporation first pays a tax 
on its net income, and then the shareholders pay another tax on the 
remaining net income.33  Contrast this with the tax effects on owners of 
pass-through entities:34 pass-through entities aren’t taxed at the entity level, 
so owners of pass-through entities are taxed only once on the net income 
 
be used to justify an unequal division of assets, which division might not hold up in an accounting or 
tax context.  Also, goodwill in a marital context is usually determined by state law.  In any event, this 
type of goodwill is beyond the scope of this article. 
 30. A corporation is an entity formed under state law.  A corporation’s tax status is determined by 
the Code.  By default, for tax purposes, a corporation is a “C” corporation.  I.R.C. §§ 11, 1361(b).  
Corporations wishing to have a different tax status (the most common is an S corporation) must form as 
a corporation under state law, and then elect to have a different tax status by filing a form with the 
Service.  See, e.g., IRS Form 2553, Election by a Small Business Corporation. 
 31. The rates for 2015 were: 
For taxable income over But not over The tax rate is
$0 $50,000 15% 
$50,000 $75,000 25%
$75,000 $100,000 34%
$100,000 $335,000 39% 
$335,000 $10,000,000 34%
$10,000,000 $15,000,000 35%
$15,000,000 $18,333,333 38% 
$18,333,333 ----- 35%
I.R.C. § 11. 
 32. Corporate distributions of assets (or the cash available after the sale of those assets) to its 
shareholders were not always taxed.  Under the General Utilities doctrine, a corporation recognized no 
gain or loss on the distribution of appreciated property to its shareholders.  Gen. Utils. & Operating Co. 
v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935).  This benefit eroded over time, until the doctrine was completely 
repealed by the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.  In 
addition, corporations were prevented from circumventing the repeal of the General Utilities doctrine 
by converting into an S corporation before distributing appreciated assets to its shareholders, by 
imposing a corporate level tax on distributions made within 10 years of the conversion to S corporation 
status.  I.R.C. § 1374. 
 33. This assumes that the corporation distributes the remaining net income to the shareholders.  
The corporation may choose to reinvest the money, e.g., expansion or new equipment.  Until a 
corporation distributes net income (or any income or asset) to the shareholders, the shareholders are not 
taxed on it. 
 34. A pass-through entity is a sole proprietorship, a limited or general partnership, a limited 
liability company or an S corporation.  In other words, a C corporation is the only business entity form 
that has a double level of taxation.  However, some states do assess an entity level tax on pass-through 
entities, e.g., California. 
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from that pass-through entity.35 
All things being equal,36 it is always more economically advantageous 
for owners to receive income from a sale of assets as an owner of a pass-
through entity rather than as an owner of a C corporation.  The simplistic 
example below, in which a corporation sells its assets for a net (pre-tax) 
$11,000,000,37 shows how a pass-through entity owner would end up with 
$3,080,000 more than an owner of a C corporation: 
 
 C Corporation Pass Through Entity 
Net income from sale of assets     $11,000,000 $11,000,000 
Less 35% corporate tax38 $3,850,000                0 
Net income available to 
shareholders 
$7,150,000 $11,000,000 
Less 20% qualified dividend 
rate39 
$1,430,000 $  2,200,000 
Net income to shareholders 
after taxes 
$5,720,000 $  8,800,000 
 
C. TAX CONSEQUENCES FOR BUYER OF ASSETS FROM A CORPORATION40 
 
A buyer of assets from a corporation can have two financial benefits 
from the purchase of those assets.  First, the buyer gets a step up in basis 
for the assets purchased,41 and second, the buyer can expense (deduct)42 
 
 35. The one downside to net income from a pass-through entity is that the owners will be taxed on 
the net income, even if the company does not distribute it out to the owners. 
 36. And it is never equal.  A sale of assets can have considerations that go far beyond tax 
consequences. 
 37. The $11,000,000 figure was used to secure a high tax rate. See supra note 31. 
38.  This 35% tax rate is an approximation.  See supra note 31. 
39.  The qualified dividend rate is the same as the capital gains rate.  I.R.C. § 1(h)(11).  For people 
with high incomes, the highest capital gains rate is 20%.  § 1(h)(1)(D).   
 40. Whether or not the seller of assets is a C corporation or an S corporation has no effect, tax-
wise, for the buyer.  In fact, the effect on the buyer of assets will be the same no matter what form of 
entity of the seller, including limited liability companies, partnerships or sole proprietorships. 
 41. This result is different to the one a buyer gets from the purchase of stock.  As with purchases 
for most assets, an asset’s basis for a purchaser is the fair market value on the date of acquisition, which 
is generally the amount that the purchaser paid for those assets.  The benefit to the purchaser accrues 
when the purchasing corporation sells those assets to a third party: the gain for the purchasing 
corporation is the amount they receive for those assets from the third party less the amount they paid for 
those assets.  For example, if a selling corporation sold assets worth $1,000,000, but those assets had a 
basis of $400,000 in the hands of the selling corporation, those assets would then have a basis of 
$1,000,000 for the purchaser.  Then assume that the purchasing corporation sold the assets to a third 
party for $1,300,000.  The purchasing corporation would only have a $300,000 gain.  However, if the 
purchasing corporation had purchased the stock of the selling corporation rather than its assets, and the 
corporation sold the assets for $1,300,000, the purchasing corporation would have a $900,000 gain: the 
third party selling price ($1,300,000) less the carry over basis from the selling corporation ($400,000). 
 42. The idea is that assets don’t last forever, so a company can deduct, as an expense, the cost of 
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some of the purchase price of some of the assets via depreciation43 and 
amortization.44 
 
III. I.R.C. SECTION 197 
 
A. PRE-SECTION 197 
 
Prior to 1993,45 allocating part of the purchase price to intangible 
assets in an asset purchase was fraught with the risk of litigation.46  Only 
intangibles that had a limited life that could be ascertained with reasonable 
accuracy could be amortized,47 and goodwill was not amortizable at all.48  
Therefore, the more that was allocated to goodwill equaled a higher 
effective purchase price of the assets, as the buyer couldn’t deduct any of 
the amount allocated to goodwill.  The Service frequently challenged 
allocations to intangibles other than goodwill, taking the position that the 
purchaser-identified non-goodwill intangible assets were really goodwill.49  
A secondary problem was that the regulations didn’t define the useful life 
of many intangible assets,50 so the allocation for each individual intangible 
 
those assets over the useful life of those assets.  The useful life of assets is statutorily proscribed in the 
Code.  See I.R.C. § 168.  For example, office furniture is considered to have a useful life of 7 years, and 
nonresidential real property used in a business to have a useful life of 39 years.  § 168. 
 43. “Depreciation” is the word used for deducting the cost of certain tangible assets over that 
asset's useful life.  See I.R.C. § 167(a); Reg. § 1.167(a)-1.  Common examples of depreciable assets 
include equipment, office furniture, trucks and buildings.  Common examples of non-depreciable 
tangible assets include inventory and land. 
 44. “Amortization” is the word used for deducting the cost of certain intangible assets over that 
asset's useful life, as well as certain business costs.  Common examples of amortizable assets include 
goodwill, patents, and trademarks; and examples of amortizable business costs include start-up costs 
and the costs of research and development.  In addition, there are some assets that can only be 
amortized if purchased, e.g., goodwill.  See Chapter 8, Amortization, in the Service’s Publication 535, 
for a more in-depth discussion of this topic.  I.R.S. PUBLICATION 535, BUSINESS EXPENSES, 
Amortization, (Jan. 7, 2016). 
 45. Section 197 of the Code was enacted in 1993. 
 46. Gregory M. Beil, Comment, Internal Revenue Code Section 197: A Cure for the Controversy 
Over the Amortization of Acquired Intangible Assets, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 731, 733 (1995). 
 47. § 167. 
 48. See Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (“If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be 
of use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which can 
be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the subject of a depreciation 
allowance.  Examples are patents and copyrights.  An intangible asset, the useful life of which is not 
limited, is not subject to the allowance for depreciation.  No allowance will be permitted merely 
because, in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life.  No 
deduction for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.  For rules with respect to 
organizational expenditures, see section 248 and the regulations thereunder.  For rules with respect to 
trademark and trade name expenditures, see section 177 and the regulations thereunder.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 49. See Hous. Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(outlining several cases where taxpayers were unsuccessful in appealing for an amortization deduction). 
 50. However, the regulations under section 197 do define the useful life of some intangibles, e.g., 
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asset had to be supported, which involved costly appraisals and expert 
opinions.51  As the Code and regulations had so little guidance on what an 
amortizable intangible was, the courts ended up developing the definitions, 
which then evolved into the idea that an amortizable intangible asset had to 
have an ascertainable value that was separate from any other asset, 
including goodwill, and had a limited and determinable life.52  And, even 
with expert opinions and statistical information, the answers were never 
clear, and the Service seemed to challenge them all.53  The issues involved 
(a) whether certain intangibles could be amortized at all,54 (b) if certain 
intangibles had a “reasonably ascertainable useful life”55 and (c) how to 
allocate the purchase price of various intangibles.56  A purchaser would 
want to have as many assets be amortizable as possible, using the shortest 
useful life available, and the Service would want as much of the intangible 
assets to be non-amortizable as possible.  Chaos ensued. 
The allocation of the purchase price to various intangible assets had an 
effect on the seller as well, in that the inability of the buyer to amortize a 
large part of the purchase price would decrease the amount that the buyer 
was willing to pay for the assets.  In addition, as the seller would want to 
allocate as much of the purchase price as possible to assets with higher 
bases, 57 evaluating the allocation choices to arrive at an overall purchase 
price complicated the negotiations.  Also, the parties would need to agree 
on the allocation of the purchase price to the various assets58 and the 
scenarios had to take into account the risk of the Service not respecting the 
allocation. 
On the eve of the passage of section 197,59 the Supreme Court decided 
Newark Morning Ledger v. United States,60 which opened the door to 
 
patents, which were recoverable over a 17-year period.  Before the enactment of section 197, the only 
code section that referenced amortization of intangibles was section 167, and the regulations thereunder.  
See Reg. § 1.167(a)-3. 
 51. Beil, supra note 46, at 736. 
 52. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 565-66 (1993). 
 53. Government estimates from 1991 were that the Service had assessed $8 billion against 
taxpayers who amortized intangibles that the Service claimed were goodwill.  Estimates from 1993 
show that the Service made over $14.4 billion in proposed adjustments relating to amortization of 
intangible assets.  Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing the New Intellectual Property 
Right, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2004). 
 54. See, e.g., Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 568. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The seller would want to allocate as much of the purchase price to assets with the highest 
bases, in order to reduce the amount of taxable gain. 
 58. Both the seller and the buyer file a IRS Form 8594, Asset Acquisition Statement Under Section 
1060, in which each side allocates the purchase price to the various assets.  Although there is no law 
that requires the amounts on the forms to agree, it would be a red flag if they did not. 
 59. The bill passed on August 6, 1993, and President Clinton signed it into law on August 10, 
1993. 
 60. Newark Morning Ledger, 507 U.S. at 566. 
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allowing some intangible assets that might previously been thought of as 
goodwill to be amortizable, provided that those assets had an ascertainable 
value and a limited useful life.  However, with the passage of section 197, 
the huge effect that this case could have had went away.61 
 
B. IRC SECTION 197 
 
Section 197 was added as a part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (“OBRA-93”).62  The addition of section 197 
added three major changes to the amortization of intangibles: first, it 
defined which intangibles were amortizable,63 it now set a standard 15-year 
amortization schedule for section 197 intangibles,64 and it allowed 
amortization of goodwill for the first time.65  At first glance, section 197 
saved money for a buyer of a business with intangible assets: the buyer no 
longer had the costs of experts to prove that the intangibles had a 
reasonably ascertainable life and how long that life was, and the buyer also 
no longer had the costs of litigation from the Service about the existence of 
intangibles or their useful life.  The intangibles were defined in the 
regulations, and all intangibles were amortized over 15 years.  Now, a 
buyer wouldn’t care about the allocation between different intangibles, 
because all would be amortizable over 15 years.66  However, other 




 61. On its face, it can look like the enactment of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act in 1993, Pub. 
L. 103–66, 107 Stat. 312, was a reaction to Newark Morning Ledger.  See, e.g., Catherine L. Hammond, 
Note and Comment, The Amortization of Intangible Assets: Section 197 of the Internal Revenue Code 
Settles the Confusion, 27 CONN. L. REV. 915 (1995).  However, Congress had been working on adding 
section 197 for several years, and passed the law on August 6, 1993.  Newark Morning Ledger had only 
been decided four months earlier, on April 20, 1993. 
 62. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103–66, 107 Stat. 312.  Also known 
colloquially as the Deficit Reduction Act of 1993, this Act was quite controversial at the time, as it 
raised the limit on personal income taxes to 39.6%, and corporations to 35%.  It passed the Senate with 
a 51-50 vote, with Vice President Al Gore voting to break the tie.  Roll Call Votes, U.S. SENATE, 103RD 
CONGRESS, 1ST SESS., Aug. 6, 1993, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote 
_cfm.cfm?congress=103&session=1&vote=00247.  The addition of Section 197 was only a small part 
of the Act. 
 63. I.R.C. § 197(d).  The section 197 intangibles, in addition to goodwill, are going concern value 
(§ 197(d)(1)(B)); workforce in place (§ 197(d)(1)(C)(i)); business records, including customer lists  
(§ 197(d)(1)(C)(ii)); patents and copyrights (§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iii)); customer-based intangibles  
(§ 197(d)(1)(C)(iv)); supplier-based intangibles (§ 197(d)(1)(C)(v); and the catch-all phrase “any other 
similar item” (§ 197(d)(1)(C)(vi)); as well as governmental licenses and permits (§ 197(d)(1)(D)); 
covenants not to compete, but only in connection with an acquisition (§ 197(d)(1)(E)); and any 
franchise, trademark or trade name (§ 197(d)(1)(F)). 
 64. § 197(a). 
 65. § 197(d)(1)(A). 
 66. Solomon v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389, n.11 (2008). 
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C. ALLOCATION OF PURCHASE PRICE TO GOODWILL. 
 
The acceptance of goodwill as an amortizable asset raised a different 
type of allocation problem for some buyers of assets.  Often, when a buyer 
purchases the assets of a small business and those assets include goodwill, 
the terms of sale will almost always include some sort of covenant not to 
compete from the individual sellers of the business.  The buyer will want to 
insure that the seller is not going to restart the same or a similar business 
down the road and compete with the just-purchased business.  As goodwill 
includes “the expectancy of continued customer patronage,”67 a covenant 
not to compete is the insurance that the expectancy will be fulfilled.  As a 
result, goodwill and a covenant not to compete often go hand-in-hand in a 
sale of assets, and part of the purchase price has to be allocated between 
those two intangibles.  The buyer will not care about the allocation between 
the two–both goodwill and a covenant not to compete are amortizable over 
a 15-year period.  The seller, however, will care a great deal: goodwill is a 
capital asset68 and the seller will only pay taxes on the amount allocated to 
goodwill at capital gains tax rates,69 and, a covenant not to compete is taxed 
at ordinary income rates.70 
 





Goodwill is likely to be a part of the sale of a closely held business. 
Often, the owners are the ones on the front lines, running the day-to-day 
operations of the business.  The owners have built up the business 
themselves, and have built customer loyalty based on personal 
relationships.  When a buyer purchases a closely held business, it is often 
purchasing that customer loyalty, expecting that the customers will want to 
continue to patronize the same old business, even with new faces running 
it.  The challenge for the buyer is how to keep customer loyalty when the 
customers are no longer seeing the old faces, especially when the owner is 
providing a professional service, e.g., an attorney, physician, dentist or real 
estate agent–there is only one face to the business, and it is the face of the 
one who is leaving.  In those situations, it is often not enough to just have 
the owner agree to not compete with the business it is selling, the owner 
 
 67. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1). 
 68. See Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir.1963) (“It is settled that good will, as 
a distinct property right, is a capital asset under the tax laws.”). 
 69. This is true only if the seller is a pass-through entity or a sole proprietor.  C corporations do not 
have capital gains tax rates. 
 70. Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 773 (3d Cir. 1967). 
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will also need to provide consulting services to the new owner, e.g., 
introducing the new owner to customers, suppliers and vendors, and 
community organizations.  These consulting services also become part of 
the purchase price: the buyer agrees to pay the owner over time for the 
seller’s time and effort in integrating the buyer into the seller’s business.  
The seller will want to allocate as little of the purchase price as possible to 
the consulting agreement: not only will it be ordinary income, but it will 
also be subject to self-employment taxes.71  The buyer, on the other hand, 
will want as much of the purchase price as possible allocated to the 
consulting agreement: the buyer will be able to immediately deduct the 
payments made under the consulting agreement, as opposed to amortizing a 
covenant not to compete or goodwill over a 15-year period. 
When the seller is a C corporation, that corporation will be indifferent 
to the various allocations between intangibles, as a C corporation has only 
one tax rate, so whether or not a gain is from a capital asset or a non-capital 
asset won’t affect the tax assessed on the gain.  The shareholders of that C 
corporation won’t care either–they’ll only bemoan the fact that the money 
available to be distributed to them is less because the C corporation had to 
first pay taxes on the sale. 
As a result, a C corporation seller will normally prefer a stock sale 
rather than an asset sale: the C corporation shareholder will pay capital 
gains only on the difference between their basis in the stock and the amount 
they received for their stock from the buyer.  However, a buyer will not 
prefer a stock purchase, because it will have paid out lots of money with 
nothing to immediately expense, and it will not get a step up in basis of the 
seller’s assets.  In addition, a buyer cannot pick and choose among assets 
when it is purchasing stock.  Then, to add insult to injury, when that buyer 
eventually decides to sell its acquired assets, it is now going to have to pay 
a corporate tax on the difference between the sale price of the assets and 
the basis in the assets, which basis was not stepped up at the first sale. 
 
B. PERSONAL GOODWILL 
 
For a closely held C corporation that is selling its assets, there is a way 
for an owner (shareholder) of the corporation to avoid at least some of the 
double taxation associated with a sale of assets: to allocate some of the 
purchase price to the owner directly as personal goodwill, rather than the 
sale of goodwill held by the C corporation.  That scenario allows some of 
the proceeds to avoid going through the corporation (avoiding the corporate 
tax) and be taxed at the capital gains tax rate of the owner. 
Using the same example as in Section II.B. as a starting point, this 
second example shows how the owner of a C corporation benefits from a 
 
 71. I.R.C. § 1402(b). 
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personal goodwill allocation.  First, a reminder of the net amount a 
shareholder from a C corporation takes home after taxes without an 
allocation to goodwill:  
 
 C Corporation
Net income from sale of assets $11,000,000 
Less 35% corporate tax $3,850,000 
Net income available to shareholders $7,150,000 
Less 20% qualified dividend rate72 $1,430,000 
Net income to shareholders after taxes $5,720,000 
 
Next, assume that the total amount paid for the business is the same: 
$11,000,000.  However, now only $7,000,000 goes directly to the 
corporation, and the difference, $4,000,000, goes to the shareholder 
directly as “personal goodwill.”73  The shareholder’s net amount after taxes 
is now $6,895,400. 
 
 C Corporation Personal Goodwill 
Net income from sale of 
assets 
$7,000,000 $4,000,000 
Less 34%74 corporate tax $2,380,000               0 
Net income available to 
shareholders 
$4,620,000 $4,000,000 
Less 20% qualified dividend 
rate 
$924,600 $   800,000 
Net income to shareholders 
after taxes 
$3,695,400 $3,200,000 




Obviously, the benefit to the shareholder in any transaction depends 
on the amount of the purchase price that is allocated to personal goodwill, 
but the shareholder will always benefit if some portion of the purchase 





72.  This refers to the qualified dividend rate for incomes over $450,000. 
 73. This allocation is completely arbitrary. 
74.  As the net income is less than $10,000,000, the corporate tax rate is 34%.  I.R.C. § 11. 
75.  This table is not an either/or table as were the earlier tables. This table shows the aggregate 
path of money that go to the shareholder – one through a corporate distribution, and one directly from 
the seller. 
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Any discussion about personal goodwill always starts with the 1998 
case of Martin Ice Cream v. Commissioner, which opened the doors for 
personal goodwill to be a component in the sale of assets from a C 
corporation.77  The court in Martin Ice Cream held that, in the sale of 
intangible assets of a business, it is possible under certain circumstances to 
designate some of those intangible assets as belonging to an individual 
shareholder rather than the business itself.  Although the court in Martin 
Ice Cream never uses the words “personal goodwill” nor does it even refer 
to the assets that belong to the individual as “goodwill,” this case has long 
been considered as the first case in which part of the purchase price of a 
business can be allocated to personal goodwill.78  Although cases before 
Martin Ice Cream did hold that personal relationships of an individual 
shareholder were separate from corporate intangible assets,79 a court had 
not been faced with allocating part of a purchase price in an acquisition to 
an individual shareholder. 
 
2. Background of the case 
 
The case of Martin Ice Cream started with an argument between a 
father and his son.  Arnold Strassberg, the dad, had been in the ice cream 
distributor business since right after World War II, at about the same time 
that his son, Martin, was born.80  By the 1960s, Arnold had been pretty 
successful at getting ice cream products into big supermarkets–in fact, he 
was the one who came up with the idea of packaging ice cream by different 
brand names, and marketing different ice cream products.  Before Arnold 
started differentiating between different ice cream brands, ice cream had 
been sold in big generic tubs.81  Arnold was particularly good at building 
relationships with his big supermarket customers, but he perhaps was not 
the best businessperson.  In fact, his first ice cream distributor company 
went belly up in the1960s82 after he lost a major supplier.83 
 
 76. 110 T.C. 189 (1998). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Thomas O. Wells & Daniel Lampert, Sale of Personal Goodwill – The Executive's Parachute, 
79 Fʟᴀ. Bᴀʀ J. 31 (2005). 
 79. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 207. 
 80. Martin Strassberg was born in 1945.  Locate a Person Nationwide, LEXISNEXIS, PUBLIC 
RECORDS, last accessed Sept. 12, 2016, https://advance.lexis.com/publicrecordshome?crid=9821ddde-
d0ce-47ae-8832-aa9654475dae. 
 81. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 192. 
 82. See id. (explaining that Arnold formed his first company, Arnold’s Ice Cream, in the mid-
fifties, but filed for bankruptcy in the 1960s). 
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In 1971, Arnold decided to start another ice cream distribution 
company, which he named Martin Ice Cream (“MIC”).84  He apparently 
continued to do what he did well – cultivate and maintain the relationships 
he had with the big grocery stores.  In 1974, the founder (and inventor) of 
Haagen-Dazs, Ruben Mattus, approached Arnold about using Arnold’s 
customer relationships to help Haagen-Dazs get into the big supermarkets.  
Arnold agreed in a handshake, and then he went on to be the first ice cream 
distributor for Haagen-Dazs, as well as to revolutionize the retail market 
for premium ice cream.85 
Meanwhile, Martin, Arnold’s son, started to work for the business–
part time at first in 1971, and then full time by 1975.  Martin did not like all 
the schmoozing that his dad had to do with the big supermarkets, so Martin 
focused on the small independent stores, where all he had to do was 
supervise the loading of trucks, as he hired route salesmen to do the actual 
selling.86  Martin could remain in the background.87 
By the late 1970s, Arnold had become so successful with the Haagen-
Dazs business that Mattus, the Haagen-Dazs founder, asked Arnold to join 
him in a partnership on the West Coast.  Arnold said no.  However, Arnold 
did want to expand his business on the East Coast.  His son, Martin, did 
not, and that is when the arguments started between them.  Arnold and 
Martin carried this disagreement throughout the 1980s, especially when 
one of Arnold’s other expansion ideas failed miserably.88 
Pillsbury purchased Haagen-Dazs from Mattus in 1983.89  At about 
the same time, Ben & Jerry’s, an up and coming premium ice cream 
producer and a competitor of Haagen-Dazs, asked Arnold to distribute Ben 
& Jerry’s ice cream.90  Arnold, who was still distributing Haagen-Dazs 
products to four supermarket chains, asked  Haagen-Dazs for permission to 
distribute its competitor’s ice cream, but Haagen-Dazs refused,91 giving 
even more weight to the importance of Arnold’s supermarket contacts.  
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Initially, Martin owned 100% of the stock of Martin Ice Cream, as Arnold was trying to avoid 
any lingering bankruptcy claimants.  Id.  In 1979, Arnold became a 51% shareholder.  Id.  However, the 
record is silent about how he obtained this 51% share, and it ends up not being important to this case. 
 85. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 193. 
 86. Id. at 194. 
 87. Id. at 193–94.  
 88. Id. at 196–97. 
 89. Pamela G. Hollie, Pillsbury’s Ice Cream Chain Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1983, p. D1. 
 90. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 194. 
 91. This was a common position that Haagen-Dazs took throughout the 1980's: telling distributors 
that if they distributed Haagen-Dazs, they could not also distribute Ben and Jerry’s.  It did not appear to 
be a contractual right; rather, it was just something they could insist on because they were a big deal.  
Ben & Jerry’s sued them several times, including in an anti-trust matter.  Haagen-Dazs had even agreed 
in a settlement with Ben & Jerry’s that Haagen-Dazs would not engage in many of its exclusivity 
practices.  Ben & Jerry’s had to take Haagen-Dazs to court to enforce it.  See Ben & Jerry's Homemade, 
Inc. v. Haagen-Dazs Co., 693 F. Supp. 1256 (D. Mass. 1987). 
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One of the first contractual actions that Haagen-Dazs/Pillsbury asked for 
was that the only premium ice cream that Arnold could distribute was 
Haagen-Dazs. 
In late 1985 or early 1986, Haagen-Dazs again approached Arnold 
about acquiring access to Arnold’s relationships with the supermarkets.  
The reason for this was two-fold: first, Haagen-Dazs was planning on 
doing its own distribution from its own distribution centers and second (and 
most important), Haagen-Dazs wanted to get rid of a potential competitor.92 
This offer from Haagen-Dazs came at a good time: at this point, 
Martin and Arnold were really not getting along, and Martin did not want 
to work with Arnold any longer.93  Negotiations between Arnold and 
Haagen-Dazs started in March 1987, which soon broke down and started 
up again, and ran all the way through May 1988.94  Starting in May, the 
negotiations started in earnest, with proposals given back and forth on 
paper. 
It was what was in these proposals from Arnold that helped the 
outcome of this case to go towards an allocation of part of the purchase 
price for intangible assets to go to Arnold personally.  An early proposal 
from Arnold to Haagen-Dazs included $1.5 million for the business, as well 
as individual payments to both Arnold and Martin ($450,000 and $250,000, 
respectively) for consulting services and covenants not to compete.  Arnold 
also had the purchase documents show that both, he and his company, 
Strassberg Ice Cream Distributors, Inc. (“SIC”) (a subsidiary that MIChad 
formed, separating the business into a piece for Martin and a piece for 
Arnold) were the sellers, and not solely his company.95  The finished 
document stated that all of the Haagen-Dazs distribution rights that would 
be transferred to Haagen-Dazs were owned by SIC, and also said that 
Haagen-Dazs was not purchasing any of the non-big supermarket business 
of MIC.96  The final allocation of the purchase price for the assets was 
$300,000 for “records” and $1,200,000 for “Sellers’ Rights,”97 and the 
contract had both SIC and Arnold as the sellers.  The bill of sale signed by 
Arnold was for “all existing customer lists, price lists, historical sales 
records, promotional allowance and rebate records,” as well as “other 
 
 92. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 194–96. 
 93. Id. at 197. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Arnold and Martin had formed a new corporation, Strassberg Ice Cream Distributors, Inc. 
(“SIC”), which was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Martin Ice Cream (“MIC”).  Id. at 198.  MIC put all 
its assets relating to the big supermarket business (i.e., not any independent grocery store assets of 
Martin’s side of the business) into SIC.  Id. at 200.  Arnold then gave some of his stock in MIC back to 
MIC in exchange for all of the stock in SIC.  Arnold apparently kept some MIC stock, but the opinion 
doesn’t say how much.  Id. at 210. 
 96. Id. at 202. 
 97. Id. 
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business records,” and “the goodwill associated therewith.”98  Arnold also 
signed a document that assigned all of these items to Haagen-Dazs, and he 
signed it in his capacity as president of SIC as well as for himself 
individually.  Arnold signed a consulting and non-compete agreement with 
Haagen-Dazs for an additional $450,000.  After the sale closed, Haagen-
Dazs wrote a check to SIC (not Arnold) for $1,430,340,99 which is the 
amount Arnold used when he filed his tax form for SIC, in which he 
reported that he would be reporting a gain of $1,430,340 on his personal 
tax return for 1988.100  MIC didn’t report anything at all about the sale to 
Haagen-Dazs when it filed its 1988 return.101 
Although the facts of the case are all about Arnold and his 
relationships with the supermarkets, the eventual Service audit wasn’t of 
Arnold or SIC, it was of MIC.102  The Service believed that the $1,430,340 
that went to SIC from Haagen-Dazs should have first been counted as 
having been constructively received by MIC before being distributed out to 
SIC.  If the Service was right, it would have meant that MIC would have to 
pay a corporate level of tax on that receipt prior to its distribution to SIC.103 
 
3.  The court’s ruling 
 
Luckily for MIC, the court held that the $1,430,340 received by SIC 
was really for intangible assets that were owned only by Arnold, and that 
those assets had never been owned by MIC.104  Since those assets had never 
been corporate assets of MIC, there was no corporate level of tax assessed 
on MIC. 
The factors that led to the court’s decision were: 
1.  Both Arnold, as an individual, and Arnold, as president of SIC, 
 
 98. Id. at 204. 
 99. The final price was reduced to this amount following an agreed-to audit and sales price formula 
in the purchase agreement.  Id. at 214. 
 100. Id. at 205. 
 101. This is interesting because Martin, MIC and Arnold had the same accountant: Rudolph 
Bergwerk.  Id. at 204.  Another interesting aside is that the Court allowed Bergwerk to be MIC’s expert 
witness on the value of MIC, even in light of Bergwerk’s work as the accountant for everybody and 
Bergwerk’s lack of appraiser qualifications, and then Bergwerk screwed up the tax returns of MIC, 
which MIC ultimately paid a penalty for.  Id. at 235.  Bergwerk was a sole practitioner in the small 
bedroom community of Livingston, New Jersey, where Arnold and Martin both lived.  Locate a Person 
Nationwide, LEXISNEXIS, PUBLIC RECORDS, last accessed Sept. 12, 2016, https://advance.lexis.com/ 
publicrecordshome/?pdmfid=1000200&crid=aba0d96a-bd6f-41a3-9141-a99713bc14b8&ecomp=7n5k 
k&prid=c30d8ddd-57ac-4141-9a99-bdc5fb55e8a9. 
 102. If MIC’s accountant, Rudolph Bergwerk, had properly filed MIC’s IRS Form 1120S, would 
the Service have audited MIC?  Even if the Service disagreed with the characterization of the proceeds 
of the sale of assets, the figures on their respective IRS Forms 1120S would have matched for both MIC 
and SIC, and perhaps not have triggered an audit.  See Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 204-05 (outlining 
several discrepancies in MIC’s IRS Form 1120S). 
 103. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 206. 
 104. Id. 
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signed the purchase agreement documents.105  This showed that Arnold 
himself was a party to the sale of assets, so he could properly receive part 
of the payout. 
2.  The contract to sell the assets showed two different types of assets: 
the intangible assets, which the court said belonged to Arnold, and the 
business records, which the court said belonged to SIC (and therefore had 
belonged to MIC before those records had been transferred to SIC, and 
therefore MIC would need to pay corporate taxes on that).106 
3.  The personal relationships with the supermarket that belonged to 
Arnold personally pre-dated the start of MIC107 (which lent credence to the 
idea that MIC didn’t own those relationships, especially since Arnold had 
never transferred those relationships to MIC). 
4.  The success of the supermarket distribution business was 
dependent entirely on Arnold personally108 (and therefore those 
relationships would have no value to MIC if Arnold were not working for 
MIC). 
5.  Mr. Mattus (the Haagen-Dazs founder) wanted to partner with 
Arnold personally, not with MIC.109 
6.  Arnold hadn’t ever entered into a covenant not to compete or an 
employment agreement with MIC (which meant that Arnold’s personal 
relationships and distribution expertise had never been transferred to or 
become the property of MIC).111  The court went on to say that even if 
there had been an agreement, some of the purchase price still would have 
belonged to Arnold personally, because of Mr. Mattus’ desire to work with 
Arnold personally.112  The lack of an employment agreement and lack of a 
covenant not to compete between Arnold and MIC is almost universally 
acknowledged as the main reason for the Court’s decision.113  In 
subsequent cases, this factor became one of the most important in a court 
respecting an allocation of personal goodwill to an owner of a 
corporation.114 
7.  The disparity between the price paid by Haagen-Dazs to Arnold 
and SIC and the value of MIC before the split off of the supermarket 
business115 added to the point that there was excess value that could only 
have belonged to Arnold, the one variable taken away in the calculation. 
 
 105. Id. at 204. 
 106. Id. at 206–07. 
 107. Id. at 207. 
 108. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 207. 
 109. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 208. 
 113. See, e.g., Wells & Bergez, supra note 2, at 191. 
 114. See Solomon v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (2008); see also Part IV.E.1, infra. 
 115. This is the idea that the difference between the amount paid by Haagen-Dazs and the value of 
Martin Ice Cream as an on-going business was the premium paid for Arnold personally. 
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8.  The original purchase documents prepared by Haagen-Dazs 
showed the sellers being Martin, MIC, SIC and Arnold.  Arnold had the 
documents changed to show only SIC and Arnold as the sellers.116  This 
showed that the parties intended (and thus were part of the negotiations) to 
have Arnold as a seller. 
9.  MIC was out of the negotiations a month before the deal closed 
which gave weight to the idea that this transaction was properly attributed 
only to SIC and Arnold. 
There were two factors that the court downplayed or overlooked in 
reaching its decision, factors that courts have since found to be extremely 
important in a finding of personal goodwill: first, the purchase agreement 
did not allocate the purchase price between Arnold and SIC – in fact, 
Haagen-Dazs only wrote one check, and it was to SIC.117  The court chose 
to go with substance over form in order to find that the payment was 
allocable between Arnold and MIC.118  Although cases since Martin Ice 
Cream that have not allowed an allocation of personal goodwill relied in 
part on a stated allocation that didn’t include personal goodwill, Martin Ice 
Cream can be distinguished because it did not allocate anything at all.  
Second, there were documents prepared by MIC and Arnold that showed 
MIC distributing the distribution rights that supposedly were owned by 
Arnold personally.119  Again, the court went with substance over form, 
ignoring what the documents themselves said. 
So, for the court in Martin Ice Cream, the underlying reality of the 
deal trumped the documents themselves.  Interestingly, it was the 
underlying reality as determined by the court, and not what the parties 
believed the underlying reality to be, that won the day.  Arnold believed 
that his tax liability came from the distribution of the assets from SIC, and 
not that the distribution went to him personally.120  The result to Arnold 
would have been less proceeds, and therefore a lesser tax. 
Even though the takeaway from Martin Ice Cream is typically that 
goodwill in a corporate acquisition can sometimes be allocated to personal 
goodwill, Martin Ice Cream never discussed personal goodwill.  Rather, its 
holding referred to intangible assets.121 
After Martin Ice Cream, what courts have actually given weight to is 
not the existence or lack of an employment agreement or covenant not to 
 
 116. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 198.  The court also noted that it would have viewed this 
change negatively if it had been at the last minute.  Id. at 214–15. 
 117. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 204, n. 12. 
 118. Id. at 206. 
 119. The court waved off this problem by holding that “[w]hat petitioner did not own, petitioner 
could not transfer” rather than using the transfer documents to show evidence of ownership of those 
assets by MIC.  Id. at 209. 
 120. Id. at 202. 
 121. Id. at 206. 
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compete prior to a sale of assets.  What the cases have in common is what 
happened during the negotiations of the asset purchase.  As the court said 
in Martin Ice Cream, “[t]he substance of a transaction can be found in the 
negotiations leading up to the closing.”122  This factor is the one that runs 
through all but one123 of the personal goodwill cases after Martin Ice 
Cream. 
Always overlooked in analyses of the Martin Ice Cream opinion is the 
judge who wrote the opinion, Renato Beghe.  Judge Beghe had long shown 
an interest in the income tax treatment of allocations of intangibles in the 
sale of a business, predating his position as a judge and long before his 
decision in Martin Ice Cream.124  Interestingly, Beghe also recommended 
that parties to an acquisition start talking about allocations to intangibles 
early in the negotiations in order to back up an allocation to each one,125 
just as he stated in Martin Ice Cream.126  This viewpoint is actually what is 
in the personal goodwill cases that followed. 
 
D.  NORWALK V. COMMISSIONER127 
 
No discussion of Martin Ice Cream is complete without talking about 
its unofficial companion case, Norwalk v. Commissioner.128  Both cases 
were decided in 1998, three months apart, and Norwalk came out with a 
similar result to Martin Ice Cream in that the court found goodwill to rest 
with the shareholders rather than the corporation.129  However, the decision 
was not based on negotiations, because this case did not involve an asset 
sale. 
Norwalk was the case that opened the door to the use of goodwill in 
professional services run through C corporations.  Martin Ice Cream is 
actually an anomaly, in that the goodwill held by the individual 
shareholder, Arnold Strassberg, was for his work as a salesperson.  Most 
personal goodwill cases involve people who are in a professional service 
industry, e.g., accountants, attorneys, doctors and dentists, as the business 
of these people is more likely to count on their personal relationships with 
 
 122. Id. at 212. 
 123. See, e.g., Norwalk v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1998).  However, although 
Norwalk dealt with personal goodwill, it was not a sale of assets case. 
 124. Renato Beghe, Income Tax Treatment of Covenants not to Compete, Consulting Agreements 
and Transfers of Goodwill, 30 TAX LAWYER 587 (1977).  Beghe published this article as a partner at 
the firm of Carter, Ledyard & Milburn in New York, before he became a Tax Court judge.  Press 
Release, United States Tax Court, Obituary for Judge Renato Beghe, July 12, 2012, 
http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/ 071312.pdf. 
 125. Beghe, supra note 123, at 620. 
 126. Martin Ice Cream, 110 T.C. at 215. 
 127. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 208 (1998). 
 128. Norwalk was decided after Martin Ice Cream by two months, and cites Martin Ice Cream.  Id. 
at 214. 
 129. Id. at 216. 
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their customers. 
Norwalk is the story of two accountants, Robert DeMarta and William 
Norwalk, who formed an accounting practice as a professional corporation 
in 1985,130 and what happened when they liquidated that practice and 
joined another accounting firm. 
After forming the corporation, and even though DeMarta and 
Norwalk were the only shareholders, DeMarta and Norwalk each signed 
a 5 year employment agreement with the corporation, which also 
contained a covenant not to compete with the corporation during the 
term of the agreement.131  The employment agreement would terminate 
in 1990, by its terms. 
After seven years, which was 2 years after the employment agreement 
had terminated, DeMarta and Norwalk decided to join the accounting firm 
of Ireland, San Filippo.132  Apparently, the two accountants felt that since 
they weren’t profitable together, they would join a larger accounting 
firm.133  To accomplish the transition, the DeMarta & Norwalk board of 
directors (presumably just DeMarta and Norwalk, although the opinion is 
silent) elected to liquidate the corporation and distribute all of the 
corporation’s assets to its two shareholders.134  The only tangible assets that 
the corporation had were furniture, equipment and accounts receivable, all 
of which DeMarta and Norwalk later individually contributed to Ireland, 
San Filippo135 for their partnership interests in Ireland, San Filippo.136  
 
 130. Id. at 210.  The court opinion shows the name of the corporation as “DeMarta & Norwalk, 
CPA’s, Inc.,” but the name of the corporation was actually “De Marta & Norwalk, Certified Public 
Accountants, an Accountancy Corporation.”  The correct name shows that the company was a 
professional corporation under California law, because of the ending 3 words.  See Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 5150.  However, a professional corporation can be an S corporation or a C corporation.  From 
the opinion, we don’t know what type of corporation it was. 
 131. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 212.  The record is silent on why DeMarta and Norwalk chose 
to enter into this employment agreement.  They could have more easily done the same thing with a 
shareholders agreement, but the cost of drafting that agreement might not have been deductible for the 
corporation, as the corporation might not have been a party to the shareholders agreement. 
 132. Id.  The opinion describes this as DeMarta and Norwalk choosing to liquidate their accounting 
firm, and then 6 months later, deciding to join Ireland, San Filippo.  It begs credulity to say that this 
wasn’t in the works when they decided to liquidate, given the amount of time it would take to liquidate 
the firm, and the fact that so many employees of the corporation also went to Ireland, San Filippo. 
 133. Ireland, San Filippo was a large accounting firm (for a regional accounting firm), having 16 
partners and 90 employees as of 2009.  Press Release, Ireland, San Filippo, (June 4, 2009).  Ireland, San 
Filippo changed its name to Sensiba, San Filippo in 2009.  Ireland San Filippo Announces Name 
Change to Sensiba San Filippo, MARKETING BUSINESS WEEKLY, Dec. 20, 2009, at 213.  Norwalk is 
now the “Tax Partner-in-Charge.”  Press Release, Sensiba, San Filippo, Sensiba San Filippo Appoints 
William Norwalk Tax Partner-in-Charge, last accessed Sept. 11, 2016, http://www.ssfllp.com/sensiba-
san-filippo-appoints-william-norwalk-tax-partner-in-charge/. 
 134. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 213. 
 135. Id. at 212. 
 136. Id.  Norwalk and DeMarta valued the equipment and furniture at $59,455, and their initial 
capital accounts at Ireland, San Filippo were a total of $67,243.  Id.  Presumably, therefore, the accounts 
receivables were valued at $7,788. 
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Apparently,137 the corporation distributed no intangible assets. 
Some facts that were important to the court in deciding this case: first, 
when DeMarta and Norwalk went with Ireland, San Filippo, so did three 
other CPAs and five staff.138  Within 4 months, two of the three CPAs left 
to start their own firm, taking at least 92 clients with them.139  Five years 
after the liquidation of the corporation,140 Ireland, San Filippo had only 
retained about 10% of the clients that DeMarta and Norwalk had brought 
with them.141  The court would use these facts to show that there was no 
goodwill to be had.142 
After the dust settled, along came the Service, who claimed that the 
corporation really did distribute intangible assets to Norwalk and 
DeMarta.143  The Service determined that the corporation’s client list was 
worth $266,000, and corporate goodwill was worth $369,000,144  for a total 
of $635,000.  What makes this different from Martin Ice Cream is that in 
Martin Ice Cream, the parties were in disagreement about whom to allocate 
a distribution of actual cash, but in Norwalk, the Service was saying that 
Norwalk and DeMarta owed taxes on $635,000, an amount they had never 
actually received.  Also, and obviously, Norwalk was not an acquisition 
where actual money changed hands, as it did in Martin Ice Cream. 
The court in Norwalk held that (1) the corporation had no goodwill to 
distribute when it liquidated,145 and (2) that any customer-based intangibles 
of the corporation belonged personally to Norwalk and DeMarta.146  
Although the court cited Martin Ice Cream, it based its opinion more on 
MacDonald v. Commissioner,147 a case in which the Service also tried to 
attribute a dollar figure to goodwill in a liquidation in which MacDonald 
had received no cash.  As in Martin Ice Cream, the court in Norwalk was 
persuaded by the lack of a covenant not to compete between the 
 
 137. The opinion is silent about whether DeMarta or Norwalk distributed any corporate intangibles 
to themselves, but if they had, it would have likely been in the opinion, since intangibles was the main 
subject of the opinion. 
 138. Id. at 213. 
 139. One of the CPAs that left, Thomas Tang, says that he was with Ireland, San Filippo for six 
months.  However, he declines to name them, only referring to them as a “six office regional accounting 
firm.”  See Partner Profiles, TANG & LEE, LLP, last accessed Sept. 4, 2016, http://tanglee.com/profile/. 
 140. Although the corporation liquidated in 1992, it never dissolved, but it also didn’t keep the 
corporation active.  The California Franchise Tax Board suspended the corporation in 2000.  The 
corporation continue to exist, suspended.  Business Entity Detail #C1187124, CALIFORNIA SECRETARY 
OF STATE (2016), http://kepler.sos.ca.gov. 
 141. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 213. 
 142. Id. at 214. 
 143. Id. at 212. 
 144. Id. at 215.  The Service’s expert determined that the value of the corporation was a total of 
$870,000, so that after subtracting the intangibles, there would be $238,000 remaining.  Id.  The opinion 
is silent about to what the $238,000 was attributed. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 216.  
 147. 3 T.C. 720 (1944). 
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corporation and its shareholders or any other agreement between the 
shareholders and the corporation in which the personal relationships of the 
shareholder accountants had been transferred to the corporation.148  The 
court also may have been swayed by the Service’s underhanded method of 
calculating the value of the intangible assets:149 first, it based its opinion on 
the value of the goodwill on an approximation of future earnings, but the 
cost percentages that the Service plugged into its formula were based on 
industry standards rather than the actual operating costs of this particular 
corporation.150  Second, the Service valued the customer lists and goodwill 
as though there was a covenant not to compete in place at the time of 
liquidation,151 even though the covenants not to compete had expired two 
years prior. 
Norwalk is contrasted from Martin Ice Cream in that Norwalk didn’t 
involve any negotiations for the purchase of the accounting business.  The 
value that the Service attributed to goodwill of the accounting business did 
not involve cash, so there was no monetary figure for the two accountants 
to discuss with Ireland, San Filippo.  Therefore, negotiations played no part 
in the court’s decision, which is different from how other cases on personal 
goodwill have been decided. 
For the next 10 years after Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk were 
decided, very few cases even talked about personal goodwill.  However, 
during that time, commentators were writing about how to use personal 
goodwill in the sale of corporate assets, relying only on Martin Ice Cream 
and Norwalk.152  Then, starting in 2008, three cases dealt with the issue of 
personal goodwill,153 but those cases received very little attention, and all 
three courts didn’t allow an allocation of personal goodwill.  It was not 
until 2011, with Howard v. United States,154 that personal goodwill was 






 148. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 214. 
 149. This is pure conjecture on the author’s part, based on the tone of the opinion when discussing 
this issue, as well as the background of the judge, Robert Ruwe.  Judge Ruwe had worked for the 
Service as a special agent in the Intelligence Division for 7 years before and during law school, and then 
for 17 years as an attorney before being appointed to the Tax Court in 1987.  Judge Robert Paul Ruwe, 
UNITED STATES TAX COURT, last accessed Sept. 12, 2016, https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/ 
judges/ruwe.htm. 
 150. Norwalk, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) at 215. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See, e.g., Ibrahim, supra note 9. 
 153. Solomon v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (2008); Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 
183 (1st Cir. 2009); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268 (2010); see Part IV.E, infra. 
 154. 448 F.App'x 752 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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E. THE PROGENY OF MARTIN ICE CREAM 
 
But first, the 2008–2010 cases: the facts leading up to these cases 
actually occurred much closer in time to Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk.  
These cases showed practitioners struggling with the requirements of 
having an allocation of personal goodwill be respected by the courts.  What 
happened was that with each case, practitioners tried to use what came 
before them to try to qualify for this allocation, but none worked. 
 
1.  Solomon v. Commissioner155 
 
Solomon was the first personal goodwill case to be decided after 
Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk.156  Unfortunately for the taxpayers in 
Solomon, the court did not rule in their favor as it had for the taxpayers in 
Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk. 
Solomon was another father-son working together story, with Robert 
Solomon (the father) and Richard Solomon (the son) selling a portion of 
their business, Solomon Colors, Inc., to a competitor, Prince Manufacturing 
Co.157  The tax court held that the cash Robert and Richard, their wives and 
Solomon Colors, Inc. (together, the “Solomon Parties”) received in the sale 
was not for their personal goodwill as they had claimed on their tax returns, 
but rather was for their covenants not to compete after the sale158 (which 
would then be taxed as ordinary income rather than as capital gain).  
Interestingly, this was not what the Service had asked the court to order, 
instead, it was a third option determined by the court on its own 
initiative.159  The Service maintained that the money that Robert and 
Richard and their wives received in the sale was attributed to Solomon 
Color’s sale of its customer list, which was therefore dividend income to 
 
 155. 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389. 
 156. Ten years had passed since those cases had been decided, but perhaps it is not surprising that it 
took ten years for the first case to appear.  After Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk were decided in 1998, 
taxpayers relying on those cases for subsequent years who would then have had their allocations 
challenged by the Service would likely not be finally heard for ten years.  For example, although 
Solomon was decided in 2008, it was based on issues arising from the 2001 tax year.  Solomon, 95 
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1390. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1395. 
 159. The court did not explicitly state that it was rejecting the Service’s determination and instead, 
the court described what each side asked for and then went on to say what it found.  Id.  Therefore, 
understanding the court’s holding can take several read-throughs.  Interestingly, Westlaw 
misunderstood the holding of the court, saying that the court “held that taxpayers received interests in a 
customer list as distribution from corporation.”  Solomon, 2008 WL 174406.  Lexis had no such 
problem, saying that “The court held that the $500,000 and $140,000 that was allocated to the 
shareholders’ sale of the customer list was actually attributable to their covenants not to compete.”  
Solomon, 2008 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 107. 
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Robert and Richard.160 
The story starts with Robert and Richard Solomon, along with their 
wives, six family members and an employee stock ownership plan owning 
all of the stock of Solomon Colors, Inc.161  One line of business of their 
company was the production of Mather ore,162 and only two companies 
produced it: Solomon Colors and their competitor, Prince Manufacturing.  
By 2000, the ingredients for Mather ore had been depleted, and the only 
way to continue production of Mather ore was to use a different type of 
ingredient that would require a different type of processing equipment.  
Solomon Colors determined that it would cost about $1.5 million to replace 
their processing equipment to continue to produce Mather ore.  Since 
Prince also produced Mather ore, Prince was in the same situation. 
Prince then approached Solomon Colors about purchasing Solomon’s 
Mather ore business.163  Solomon Colors liked the idea: it would not have 
to spend the money on new equipment and new processes, and it could use 
the money from the sale to expand its operations on the West Coast.164 
From the start of negotiations until the closing, the purchase price 
remained the same: $1,500,000.165  What changed during the month of 
negotiations was the allocation of the $1.5 million purchase price.  The 
initial term sheet merely said it was for “the Mather ore division of SGS 
Solomon Colors.”166  The next term sheet said it was for the mill that 
processed the Mather ore, and a requirement that Solomon Colors stop 
producing any Mather ore products.167  Solomon Colors prepared the first 
draft of the purchase agreement, and it allocated the entire $1.5 million 
 
 160. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1394. 
 161. Brief for Petitioners at 9, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05); Opening Brief for 
Respondent at 15, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05). 
 162. Mather ore, a red iron oxide ore, is used for such things as color in concrete.  See Opening 
Brief for Respondent at 16, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05).  Originally, Solomon 
Colors was in the business of mining, but as the mines began to deplete, Solomon Colors changed its 
focus to selling pigment colors in 1972.  JANICE A. PETTERCHAK, HISTORIC ILLINOIS: AN ILLUSTRATED 
HISTORY 124 (2005).  Solomon Colors’ business is now solely concrete colors.  SOLOMON COLORS, 
INC., http://www.solomoncolors.com.  They are the largest American-owned producer of iron oxide 
pigments.  PETTERCHAK, supra, at 124. 
 163. The record is silent about why Prince Manufacturing wanted to spend the money to upgrade its 
equipment and stay in the Mather ore business, and why Solomon Colors would do the opposite.  
However, it could be because the focus of each company was so different: Solomon Colors was only in 
the concrete colors business, whereas Prince Manufacturing was more diversified, and serving many 
different industries as a contract manufacturer in the metal and composites industry.  Prince 
Manufacturing, last accessed on Sept. 6, 2016, https://www.princemanufacturing.com. 
 164. Solomon Colors eventually expanded westward, with two facilities in Rialto, California. 
 165. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1391.  The case is silent on why the anticipated cost of replacing 
the Mather ore equipment ($1,500,000) is identical to the price paid for the sale of the business.   
 166. Id.  The “SGS” comes from the prior name of Solomon Colors, which was “Solomon Grind-
Chem Services, Inc.”  Opening Brief for Respondent at 17, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-
05). 
 167. Id. at 22.  
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purchase price to the mill, even though the mill was only worth about 
$100,000.168  After the initial drafts, Prince decided that it wanted the main 
four Solomon shareholders to enter into a covenant not to compete as a 
condition of sale.169 
The parties then spent about a month negotiating the final terms of the 
deal.170  After that, the deal was then run by inside and outside accountants 
for Solomon Colors.  It was only then that a discussion of allocating the 
purchase price appears.  Although Robert Solomon had talked internally 
with Solomon attorneys about transferring a customer list as a part of the 
sale,171 any amounts to be allocated to that customer list wasn’t discussed 
in detail until the accountants became involved.  The Solomon Colors 
accountants suggested various allocations172 with the principals at Solomon 
Colors, but it is not clear when this internal discussion began to overlap 
with discussions with the principals from the Prince side. 
In the end, the parties ended up having two agreements: the first was a 
Purchase and Sale of Covenant Not to Compete Agreement (“PSCNC 
Agreement”) that allocated the $1,400,000 purchase price173 between a 
covenant not to compete and the customer list: $700,000 to Solomon 
Colors ($150,000 for the entity-level covenant not to compete, and 
$550,000 for the customer list), and $700,000 to the Solomon shareholders, 
($60,000 for the covenant not to compete, and $640,000 for the customer 
list).  All of the Solomon Parties signed the PSCNC Agreement.  The 
second agreement was a Side Agreement, which had the sale of the mill, as 
well as the provisions for transferring the Mather ore business from 
Solomon Colors to Prince.  The Side Agreement was only signed by Robert 
Solomon in his capacity as president, but not individually.  However, the 
 
 168. Id.  The reason for this, according to Solomon Colors’ attorney, was that it was worried about 
possible antitrust problem.  The antitrust problem would be a perception that Prince and Solomon 
Colors were forming a monopoly that would increase the prices of its products by virtue of being the 
only producer in town.  Id. at 21–22. 
 169. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1391. 
 170. Id. at 1391.  These negotiations weren’t memorialized in drafts of the agreement, rather they 
were gleaned from internal memos, email exchanges, fax covers to opposing counsel and oral testimony 
at trial.  See id. at 391–94 (detailing exchanges throughout memorandum).  A major part of the 
Solomon family’s argument was that it wanted more recognition for the oral testimony of the players in 
the transaction.  See Brief for Petitioners at 4, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) (No. 20294-05).  It was no 
surprise that the Service characterized all the testimony as self-serving.  See Opening Brief for 
Respondent at 16, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05). 
 171. Opening Brief for Respondent at 16, Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) 1389 (No. 20294-05). 
 172. Among the possibilities was the allocation of $550,000 to each, the company and Robert 
Solomon, for the customer lists (where $400,000 would remain to allocate).  Conversely, $880,000 
would be allocated to Solomon Colors, with the remaining $620,000 being allocated to the four main 
shareholders. 
 173. Although the opinion is not clear, apparently Prince Manufacturing paid Solomon Colors 
$100,000 at the closing for the Mather ore business, or for the machine.  Therefore, the amount being 
allocated was only $1,400,000.  See id. at 12. 
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PSCNC was incorporated by reference.174 
The Solomon Parties reported the receipt of money from the 
transaction as long term capital gain for the “Customer List/Goodwill,” and 
ordinary income for the money attributed to the covenant not to compete 
for their 2000 tax year.175  In 2005, the Service determined deficiencies for 
the Solomon Parties, based on the Service’s position that, despite the plain 
language in the PSCNC Agreement, Solomon Colors had received the 
entire amount of the sale, and then distributed money for the customer list 
to the individual Solomons.176 
Litigation followed, with the court rejecting the positions of both the 
Solomon Parties and the Service.  The court found that the customer list 
had absolutely no value at all, leaving only the covenant not to compete to 
be purchased.  However, the allocation for Solomon Colors between the 
customer list and covenant not to compete was respected (Query how the 
customer list has no value on the one hand, but it has value on the other, 
when it is the same customer list).  For Robert, Richard and their wives, the 
court decided that since the customer list had no value, the entire $700,000 
that the Solomons had received was for their covenants not to compete. 
The court distinguished Solomon from Martin Ice Cream in several 
ways: first, it found that the customer relationships between the individual 
Solomons and their customers unimportant (Martin Ice Cream found that 
the customer relationships between Arnold and the supermarkets was the 
most valuable asset being purchased); second, the individual Solomons 
weren’t named as sellers in any of the documents (Arnold was named as a 
seller of the assets), and third, Prince Manufacturing didn’t require 
employment or consulting agreements from the individual Solomons 
(Arnold had signed a consulting agreement along with a non-compete 
agreement with Haagen-Dazs). 
What’s odd about this opinion is that the court cherry-picked facts and 
law to come to the decision it did, and ignored facts and law that countered 
its opinion.  Some examples: 
The court in Solomon gave great weight to the fact that the individual 
Solomons hadn’t signed the Side Agreement in their individual capacities, 
overlooking that the Side Agreement had incorporated by reference the 
PSCNC Agreement, which did have the Solomons signing individually. 
The court’s determination that the customer list had no value to Prince 
Manufacturing was key in its finding that 100% of the proceeds that went 
 
 174. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1394. 
 175. See id. at 1394.  If the allocation had been respected, the income reporting and its 
characterization would be correct. 
 176. In other words, according to the Service, Solomon Colors should have reported the entire 
$1,400,000 as income, and the $700,000 that the individual Solomons received would be a dividend 
payment to them.  See I.R.C. § 301(c)(1). 
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to the Solomon individuals was for their covenants not to compete.177  
However, the court respected the $550,000 allocation to the customer list 
for Solomon Colors.178  The court never explains how the customer list had 
value to Prince when it came from the corporation, but it had no value 
when it came from the shareholders. 
Also, Solomon cited to Martin Ice Cream when it suited its purposes, 
and ignored any similarity to Martin Ice Cream when it did not. For 
example: 
Like Martin Ice Cream¸ the relationships developed by Robert and 
Richard179 pre-dated the formation of the corporation.180  The court in 
Solomon found that Robert and Richard Solomon had developed personal 
relationships181 just as Arnold had done in Martin Ice Cream, but Solomon 
ignored this in its opinion. 
Like Martin Ice Cream, when the corporation was formed, no 
intangible assets were transferred to the corporation.  Martin Ice Cream 
used this to show that Arnold still owned the intangible assets; Solomon 
used this to show that there were no intangible assets to transfer.182 
Like Martin Ice Cream, neither Robert or Richard Solomon had an 
employment agreement or a covenant not to compete agreement with their 
corporation.  Solomon ignores this similarity. 
In Martin Ice Cream, even though Arnold signed as an individual 
signatory, only one check was made out–to the corporation.  In Solomon¸ 
although the individual Solomons didn’t sign one of the agreements in their 
individual capacity, they did receive checks separate from the check to the 
corporation. 
What Solomon and Martin Ice Cream have in common is the theme 
that runs through all of the goodwill cases: the amount of negotiations for 
an allocation to goodwill early in the game, as well as the quality of those 
negotiations.  True, the Solomon Parties did discuss the allocations to 
goodwill (i.e., the customer lists), but they did it only as part of a 
discussion on how to make it tax advantaged. 
As the Solomon case shows, it was not enough for the parties to talk 
about allocation late in the process, and it was not enough to talk about 
allocation of goodwill without talking about the value of the goodwill other 
than as a tax strategy.  This is what the subsequent cases show as well – the 
courts are requiring a substantive discussion/negotiation over the value of 
the goodwill in order to respect an allocation of part of the purchase price 
 
 177. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1395. 
 178. Id.  
 179. As well as by Robert Solomon Senior, who had actually started the company in 1927.  
PETTERCHAK, supra note 161, at 24. 
 180. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1390. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1395. 
SHUGART.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/9/2017  3:53 PM 
Fall 2016] YOURS, MINE AND OURS 115 
towards it. 
The court was likely influenced by the Solomon accountants’ internal 
memos, which were all bad facts for the Solomon Parties.  One accountant 
referred to Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk, and then wrote that personal 
goodwill didn’t fit with the Solomon transaction, saying “as a practical 
matter, the “goodwill” that is created is arguably more at the entity level, 
not so much at the individual shareholder-employee level.”183  The 
accountant also talked about reducing Robert Solomon’s salary and 
allocating some of the purchase price to account for it.184  However, the 
accountant went on to say that the only thing that Prince was buying was 
the customer relationship,185 which the court ignored.  The accountant’s 
memos only talk about what sort of allocation would pass muster with the 
Service, and not about the various values of the assets being allocated.186  A 
Solomon attorney wrote a memo that Solomon Colors was “doing some 
creative tax planning by diverting some of the proceeds to the 
shareholders.”187 
 
2. Muskat v. United States188 
 
This case is barely a blip on the screen of personal goodwill cases, but 
it does reiterate the idea that negotiations specifically for personal goodwill 
are key to the court making a finding of personal goodwill.  In addition, 
Muskat had a different procedural start than did the other personal goodwill 
cases: this one did not start from an audit.  Rather, it was a claim for refund 
through the U.S. District Court.189  The court of appeals affirmed the 
district court,190 and found that a payment for a covenant not to compete 
was not really for personal goodwill.  Most of the discussion on goodwill is 
at the lower court; the court of appeals focused more on the standard of 
proof to recharacterize income for tax purposes. 
Irwin Muskat was the president and a 37% shareholder of Jac Pac 
Foods, a business started by his grandfather and uncle.191  A subsidiary of 
Corporate Brand Foods America, Inc. (“CBFA”) purchased all of the assets 
 
 183. Id. at 1392. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 1391. 
 186. See id. at 1392. 
 187. Solomon, 95 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1392. 
 188. 554 F.3d 183 (2009). 
 189. Muskat v. United States, No. 06-cv-30-JD, 2008 WL 138052, at *1 (D. N.H. Jan. 10, 2008) 
[hereinafter Muskat 1].  At least one commentator queried whether Muskat might have prevailed if he 
been audited rather than seeking a refund.  David E. Kahen & Elliot Pisem, Sale of Closely Held 
Business: Allocations of Consideration, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 18, 2009, http://www.newyorklawjour 
nal.com/id=1202 428381075?keywords=Kahen+Pisem+Allocations. 
 190. Muskat, 554 F.3d at 187. 
 191. Id. 
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of Jac Pack for $34 million, which included about $15 million for business 
goodwill.  In addition, and in a separate agreement, CBFA agreed to pay 
Irwin personally about $5 million for a covenant not to compete, of which 
$1 million was paid on closing.  Irwin listed the $1 million payment as 
ordinary income on his 1998 tax return.  In 2002, Irwin filed a claim for a 
refund of $203,434,192 claiming he mistakenly characterized the payment as 
ordinary income, when it should have been characterized as a long term 
capital gain because the payment was really for his personal good will.193 
Irwin’s problem was that there was absolutely nothing in the record 
that could be used to recharacterize the payment for the covenant not to 
compete as a payment for personal goodwill.  Personal goodwill was never 
mentioned in the negotiations, it was never mentioned internally and it 
appears as if no one thought of this characterization until the claim for 
refund in 2002.194  Irwin tried to pull everything out of the agreements that 
he could to try to make the argument that the payment was really for 
personal goodwill, but he could not even come close.  In addition to the 
agreements being silent on personal goodwill, as well as the negotiations 
being silent on personal goodwill, CBFA’s president testified at trial that 
there was no other goodwill than the business goodwill that CBFA had 
specifically purchased.  Irwin didn’t stand a chance. 
 
3. Kennedy v. Commissioner195 
 
Kennedy is another off-the-radar case that falls in line with the 
previous cases: that failure to negotiate up front for an allocation of part of 
the purchase price to personal goodwill kills its chances of that allocation 
being respected by the Service. 
James Kennedy (“Kennedy”) was an employee benefits consultant 
running his own business as a C corporation, KCG International, Inc. when 
he began to consider selling his business in early 2000.196  In the summer of 
2000, Ed Mack (“Mack”) of Mack and Parker, Inc. (“M&P”),197 
 
 192. Id.  The payment broke down as $176,652 as ordinary income tax, and $26,782 as self-
employment tax.  Id. n.2.  Unfortunately for Irwin, he didn’t initially make a separate claim for a refund 
of the self-employment tax, so the appellate court didn’t allow a refund.  Id. at 195.  It is likely that that 
Irwin would have won the self-employment tax refund claim. 
 193. Complaint at 18, Muskat v. United States, 554 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2009) (No. 08–1513). 
 194. One reason that no one thought of it or talked about it in 1998 may have been because Martin 
Ice Cream was so new.  Martin Ice Cream was decided in March 1998.  110 T.C. at 189.  In contrast, 
the Muskat asset sale occurred only 2 months later in May 1998.  554 F.3d at 187.  
 195. Kennedy v. Commissioner, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268. 
 196. Opening Brief for Petitioners at 19, Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268 (No. 2180-08). 
 197. Mack & Parker Inc. was a subsidiary of Hub International Limited, an international insurance 
brokerage.  Press Release, Hub Int'l, Hub International Limited and Its Subsidiary Mack and Parker 
Announce Acquisition of Kennedy Consulting Group (Apr. 21, 2001) (on file with author).  Mach & 
Parker changed its name to Hub International Illinois in October 2004.  Press Release, Hub Int'l, Mack 
and Parker, Inc. Changes Name to HUB International Illinois (Oct. 4, 2004) (on file with author). 
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approached Kennedy about M&P purchasing Kennedy’s business,198 and 
on October 31, 2000, the parties closed the deal. 
At the start of the negotiations during the summer, Mack and Kennedy 
discussed the purchase price for the business, without discussing what 
M&P would actually be purchasing.199  As Kennedy would continue to 
work for M&P after the purchase of his business, Mack and Kennedy 
decided early on that the purchase price would be based on 150% of 
Mack’s predicted annual income once at M&P, with only the payment 
schedule left to determine.200  It wasn’t until September, after M&P sought 
legal advice on the transaction, that the parties gave any thought to the 
actual structure of the transaction.  M&P’s attorney, Jerry Roberts, 
contacted a tax accountant to look for ways to “enhance the tax benefits,” 
and then Roberts wrote an email to Mack, listing the various structures that 
M&P might use and their tax consequences.201  At the end, Roberts 
suggested that M&P could “take the position that Kennedy owns [his 
corporation’s] customer list and the good will with the customers and hence 
could sell them directly to M&P.”202  Ultimately, it was this email, and the 
fact that the ultimate structure included a sale of the customer list, that 
caused the court to find that there was not any personal goodwill in this 
transaction.203  As the court stated, the “goodwill was a tax motivated 
afterthought that occurred late in the negotiations.”204 
Many commentators since Kennedy have focused on the court’s 
statement that “[w]e find it significant that there is a lack of economic 
reality to the contractual allocation of the payments to goodwill.”205  
However, the reason the court found a lack of economic reality in Kennedy 
was that the parties did not negotiate for it.  If the parties had ended up with 
the exact same purchase price but also showed that they discussed the 
allocation at the start of the negotiations, query whether the court would 
have still found a lack of economic reality. 
There was one oddity in this case: the court held that Kennedy would 
be liable for self-employment taxes on the amounts he received from the 
sale of assets.  What made this unusual is that the court first stated that 
because payments for a covenant not to compete are ordinary income just 
 
 198. Opening Brief for Petitioners at 20, Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 268 (No. 2180–08). 
 199. Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 269. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id.  The Kennedys were also assessed an accuracy related penalty.  However, because the 
Kennedys reasonably relied on Roberts, who consulted a tax attorney he relied on for advice, the court 
concluded that the Kennedys were not liable for the penalty.  Id. at 275. 
 202. Id. at 269. 
 203. See id. at 273. 
 204. Id. at 274. 
 205. See e.g., Robert F. Reilly, Kennedy v. Commissioner: Income Tax Consequences of Structuring 
the Company Purchase/Sale Transaction, INSIGHTS 64 (2011).  See also Charles J. Reichert, Sale of 
Business Generates Ordinary Income, 211 J. ACCT. 57 (2011). 
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as payment for services are ordinary income, the court did not need to 
allocate the payments between services and noncompetition obligations.206  
However, although both are ordinary income, only payment for services is 
also subject to self-employment tax.207  The court apparently did not know 
about this distinction, as it went on to say that simply because it had 
decided that the payments were ordinary income, the payments were 
necessarily includable in self-employment income.208 
 
F. HOWARD V. UNITED STATES209 
 
Unlike the cases after Martin Ice Cream cited above, Howard v. 
United States210 was the first case since Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk that 
got a lot of attention,211 perhaps because it was the first case after 1998 that 
dealt with a professional corporation, but also perhaps because it was read 
as the opposite result of Norwalk,212  as both cases dealt with professional 
practices, but came up with different results. 
Larry Howard was a dentist who wanted to start the transition to 
retirement at the relatively young age of 55.213  He had been practicing as a 
dentist since 1972, and operating his dental practice as a C corporation 
since 1980.214  Dr. Howard ran the corporation as one should: he ran 
everything through it, e.g., the payroll, malpractice insurance, 
reimbursement of his expenses.  In addition, in what would turn out to be 
the deciding factor in his case, and for no apparent reason,215 Dr. Howard 
entered into an employment agreement as well as a covenant not to 
compete agreement with his new corporation.  In the detailed 10 page 
agreement,216 among other things, Dr. Howard agreed to not compete with 
 
 206. Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 274. 
 207. I.R.C. § 197(d)(1)(E). 
 208. Kennedy, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) at 275. 
 209. Howard v. Commissioner, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010), aff’d, 448 Fed. Appx. 752 (2011). 
 210. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533. 
 211. See Mark L. Silow, Goodwill and Professional Service Corporations, 244 LEGAL 
INTELLIGENCER 5 (2011). 
 212. Scott E. Vincent, Ninth Circuit Rejects Personal Goodwill Allocation in Sale of Professional 
Practice, 67 J. MO. BAR 309 (2011). 
 213. Howard was born in 1946.  Provider Credential Search for Larry Eugene Howard, WASH. 
STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, last accessed Sept. 2, 2016, https://fortress.wa.gov/doh/providercred 
entialsearch/SearchCriteria.aspx. 
 214. The corporation was formed as a Professional Service Corporation under the Revised Code of 
Washington, Title 18, 18.100.010 et seq., on October 1, 1980.  LEXISNEXIS, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE 
CORP. FILING RECORDS (on file with author). 
 215. There is no business or tax reason for the sole shareholder of a corporation to enter into an 
employment agreement with that corporation.  Others have noted this as well.  See, e.g., Silow, supra 
note 210, at 5. 
 216. Memorandum in Support of United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment at Section A, 
January 15, 2010, Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010) (E.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2010) 
(No. 08–365). 
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his corporation, including for an additional 3 year period after no longer 
owning stock in the company.217 
In 2002, Dr. Howard put his business up for sale with a business 
broker, and attracted a young dentist from South Dakota, Bryan Finn.218  
When Dr. Finn decided to purchase the practice, he had not discussed 
anything about the structure of the purchase; rather, he had only been 
presented with a total price, which he accepted.219  Apparently, someone 
other than Dr. Finn or Dr. Howard decided how to allocate the purchase 
price, and then presented a summary of what the allocation meant to both 
dentists.220  The final purchase price was $613,000, with $549,900 
allocated to Dr. Howard’s personal goodwill,221 $16,000 allocated to Dr. 
Howard for a covenant not to compete with Dr. Finn’s practice,222 and 
$47,100 allocated to Dr. Howard’s corporation for equipment and 
miscellaneous assets.223  Dr. Howard and his wife, Joan, filed their 2002 
federal tax return, reporting $320,358 as long term capital gain.224 
For three years following the purchase by Dr. Finn, Dr. Howard 
continued to work as a dentist, but only part time,225 and was paid through 
his corporation (not Dr. Finn’s).  Dr. Howard’s corporation paid him 
$110,000 per year, and he continued to receive benefits from his 
corporation.226  The Service subsequently audited the Howards’ tax return, 
recharacterized the sale of the goodwill as a corporate asset, treated the 
amount received by the Howards as a dividend from Dr. Howard’s 
corporation and then charged the Howards with a deficiency.227  The 
 
 217. Id. 
 218. DR. BRYAN FINN, SPOKANE DENTIST, WASH., http://www.newexpressionsdental.com/about_ 
us/Dr_Bryan_K_Finn.htm. 
 219. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 9. 
 220. See Memorandum in Support of United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment at Section A, 
January 15, 2010, Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010) (E.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2010) 
(No. 08–365).  Dr. Howard’s attorney used the passive voice in explaining the summary (“A ‘summary’ 
of the proposed Asset Purchase Agreement was provided to the parties”).  What’s interesting is that the 
summary was provided to both parties, indicating that a broker handled the transaction for both parties, 
without either having an attorney. 
 221. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 3. 
 222. Id. 
 223. United States’ Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 
Background, Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010) (E.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2010) (No. 
08–365). 
 224. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 4. 
 225. Id.  One of Dr. Howard’s hobbies was restoring old aircraft, at which he apparently spent much 
of his free time.  Following the sale of his dental practice, he flew in the 2003 National Air Tour, an 
organization that recreates the 1925-1931 National Air Tours.  See Planes, Pilots & People of the 2003 
tour!, NATIONAL AIR TOUR, http://www.nationalairtour.org/pilotplanespeople/. 
 226. Although the record is silent on the financial structure of the practice after the sale to Dr. Finn, 
it is likely that Dr. Howard kept his name on the business in order to assist Dr. Finn in passing the 
business over to Dr. Finn, and that there was some sort of calculation for how much money coming into 
the practice went directly to Dr. Howard’s corporation. 
 227. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 4. 
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Howards paid the deficiency, and then made a claim for refund.228 
In recharacterizing the goodwill as a corporate asset, the Service 
focused primarily on Dr. Howard’s employment and covenant not to 
compete agreement between him and his corporation.229  The Service went 
through a litany of rights that Dr. Howard’s corporation had because of 
those agreements, and determined that since the corporation owned all of 
the assets and rights of the corporation, it necessarily owned all of the 
goodwill as well.230  Interestingly, when the Service made the argument 
that “courts look for employment agreements and covenants not to 
compete, which by their very existence, make the relationships developed 
by the employee the property of the corporation,”231 it cited no cases for 
that proposition.  Later in its argument, the Service cited statements in 
Martin Ice Cream and MacDonald v. Commissioner232 that the absence of 
employment agreements means that the personal goodwill (or a taxpayer’s 
ability, in MacDonald) is not owned by the contracting corporation.  
However, Martin Ice Cream and MacDonald never said that – rather, they 
only used the lack of employment agreements as evidence that the personal 
goodwill did not belong to the corporation. 
On the other side, the first argument made by Dr. Howard was to 
analogize to dissolution of marriage cases, in which the value of the 
personal goodwill of a spouse in a professional practice is divided between 
the spouses.233  The court never addressed this argument other than to say 
that the Howards made it, perhaps because valuing the goodwill of a 
community property interest was irrelevant to a discussion of personal 
goodwill belonging to a corporation or an individual.234,235  The Howard 
case was dealing with federal income tax law, and its attorney was arguing 
state community property law. 
The second argument made by Dr. Howard was that the asset purchase 
agreement clearly allocated the purchase price.  The court promptly 
dismissed this argument, based on the substance over form concept of the 
personal goodwill cases, because the agreement did not reflect the 
 
 228. Id.  The case was actually a decision of two competing summary judgment motions, as the 
Howards and the Service agreed on all the material facts. 
 229. Memorandum in Support of United States’ Motion for Summary Judgment, January 15, 2010, 
Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533 (2010) (E.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2010) (No. 08–365).   
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at Argument. 
 232. MacDonald v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 720, 727 (1944). 
 233. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 8. 
 234. The Howards’ attorney was Gary Randall, of Workland & Witherspoon, he was primarily a tax 
and community property attorney, and taught classes on these subjects at Gonzaga University for over 
30 years.  Gary Randall, WORKLAND & WITHERSPOON, http://workwith.com/gary-c-randall/. 
 235. Howard, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 5533, at 9.  In fact, the court gave such short shrift to the dissolution 
analogy that when it came to discussing the Howards’ third argument, the court labeled it as the 
Howards’ second argument.   
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relationship between Dr. Howard and Dr. Finn.236  The court was 
influenced not just by the lack of negotiations for the allocation, but the 
fact that the allocation had not even been mentioned at all.237 
Dr. Howard’s third argument, which might be characterized as 
clutching at straws, was that when Dr. Howard sold his business, that 
action necessarily terminated the employment and covenant not to compete 
agreement.  Dr. Howard’s theory was that since he could have modified the 
agreement at any time, the sale of the company did just that.238 
The Court went with the Service.  In addition to ignoring the 
dissolution case law presented by the Howards and dismissing out of hand 
the idea that what the contract explicitly says should control the allocation, 
the court went with the existence of the employment and covenant not to 
compete agreement to mean that the goodwill was a corporate asset.  It 
added that even if the sale of assets to Dr. Finn terminated the employment 
and covenant not to compete agreement, the goodwill accumulated during 
the existence of the agreement stayed with the corporation. 
Howard, then, added to the personal goodwill list of things not to do 
in order to have an allocation of personal goodwill respected.239 
 
G. H & M, INC. V. COMMISSIONER240 
 
As a post script to Howard, H & M tangentially tackled personal 
goodwill, and reiterated the basic ideas of Martin Ice Cream and Norwalk: 
that when the business of a corporation depends on the personal 
relationships of a key individual, there is no corporate goodwill to be sold 
(Martin Ice Cream) absent a transfer of that goodwill to the corporation 
(Norwalk).241  And, what made this case interesting was that personal 
goodwill was not even brought into the case until H & M’s post trial 
brief.242 
Howard Schmeets was the King of Insurance in Harvey, North 
Dakota.243  He had been a successful insurance agent in Harvey since the 
late 1960s, and by 1980, he was the sole shareholder of Harvey Insurance 
Agency, Inc., a North Dakota corporation.244  However, despite Mr. 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 9–10. 
 239. See, e.g., Charles J. Reichert, Whose Goodwill Is it?, JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTANCY,  Oct. 31 
2010, http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2010/nov/goodwill.html. 
 240. H & M, Inc. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452. 
 241. Id. at 457–58. 
 242. Petitioner’s Post Trial Brief at 41-42, H&M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452 (No. 16612-09). 
 243. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 452. 
 244. Id. After the sale of the corporation, Mr. Schmeets changed the name to H&M, Inc.  Id. at 455.  
They apparently had no problem with using the same name of the retail clothing store: in Mr. Schmeet’s 
case, the “H” and “M” stand for Harvey and Mona Schmeets. 
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Schmeets’ local success, he was still a relatively small Midwestern rural 
player in the national insurance game.  When large, national insurance 
companies began to demand more volume from insurance agencies in the 
1990s, Mr. Schmeets could not keep up. 
Luckily, another competitor in town with whom Mr. Schmeets had a 
history was experiencing the same problem, so the two started talking 
about combining.245  Negotiations ensued, and Mr. Schmeets decided to 
sell his company to the competitor, an agency within the National Bank of 
Harvey (the “Bank”).  Mr. Schmeets’ biggest concern was to be able to 
have continued employment, so the deal was structured to pay him $20,000 
for the assets, along with a six year employment contract with a non-
compete and some deferred comp thrown in.246  At the end of the day when 
the agreement was signed in 1992, the package was worth about 
$600,000.247 
Everything went off as planned: Mr. Schmeets worked for the new 
agency for six years, and he got all of the money he was entitled to.  At the 
end of the six years, Mr. Schmeets retired. 
After an audit, the Service sent a deficiency notice to H&M claiming, 
among other things, that the salary and deferred compensation Mr. 
Schmeets received were actually payments to the corporation for the 
insurance business.248  The Service therefore assessed the corporation for 
capital gain and interest income for the now-recharacterized salary and 
deferred compensation payments.249  H&M paid the deficiency, and then 
petitioned for a re-determination of the deficiency. 
During the trial, the Service made what H&M called a “reverse 
valuation”250–after not contesting that the assets had a value of $20,000, the 
Service claimed that the excess must be attributed to the corporation’s 
goodwill,251 claiming that substance over form requires this allocation.252 
H&M rebutted that in its post-trial brief, noting that if it was goodwill 
at all, it was personal goodwill.  Interestingly, it used the argument that 
other cases have used against personal goodwill: that since there was no 
valuation of the corporation, no discussion of tax consequences or benefits, 
and no discussion at all of the allocation of the purchase price, the Service 
cannot now claim that there was goodwill attributable to the corporation.253  
 
 245. Id. at 454. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
 248. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 456.  Presumably the statute of limitations hadn’t passed, as the 
parties had renegotiated the contract in 1993, and Mr. Schmeets deferred his compensation even further 
into the 2000s.  In fact, the audit was for the years 2001 through 2005. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Petitioner’s Post Trial Brief at 40, H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452 (No. 16612-09). 
 251. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 456. 
 252. Id.  
 253. Petitioner’s Post Trial Brief at 40-42, H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) 452 (No. 16612-09). 
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In addition, H&M argued that the testimony at trial also showed that the 
insurance business was personal to Mr. Schmeets: that it was Mr. Schmeets 
who was well known and not his agency, that business came to Mr. 
Schmeets, and not the corporation itself, that the sale would not have 
happened if Mr. Schmeets had not agreed to be employed by the Bank after 
the sale.  The idea, H&M said, was that the Bank would not have just 
purchased the Harvey Insurance Agency, it wanted Mr. Schmeets.254  H&M 
also tackled the substance over form argument, by pointing out that the 
substance of the transaction did match the form: that both parties treated 
the deal as an employment relationship, and that there were no facts to back 
up any other allocation.255 
The court fully bought H&M’s argument that the compensation was 
not goodwill belonging to the corporation.256  However, it limited its 
holding only to finding that the payments to Mr. Schmeets were not 
disguised purchase-price payments to H&M.257  Although the court 
believed that part of the compensation should have been allocated to Mr. 
Schmeets for personal goodwill, it made no finding as Mr. Schmeets’ tax 
liability was not before the court.258 
This case will likely be cited in the future for personal goodwill cases, 
as it has a good exposition of the personal goodwill doctrine, starting with a 
longer-than-typical explanation of MacDonald v. Commissioner259 and 
Newark Morning Ledger260 and a review of holdings that found personal 
goodwill. 
 
F. BROSS TRUCKING, INC. V. COMMISSIONER261 
 
The recent case of Bross Trucking, Inc. v. Commissioner revived the 
conversation about who owns the goodwill in the distribution of assets 
from a corporation.  Bross Trucking went into great detail about the 
attributes of personal goodwill v. corporate goodwill262 and found that the 
corporation had no goodwill to distribute.263  Bross Trucking defined 
personal goodwill in an overbroad manner out of sync with previous cases, 
 
 254. Id. 
 255. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 457. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 458. 
 258. H & M, 104 T.C.M. (CCH) at 458.  It actually would have been better for Mr. Schmeets if he 
had allocated part of the compensation to personal goodwill, as the personal goodwill would have had 
capital gains treatment, and his compensation not only was ordinary income, but subject to employment 
taxes as well. 
 259. MacDonald v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 720 (1944). 
 260. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993). 
 261. Bross Trucking, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1528. 
 262. Id. at 1532–35. 
 263. Id. at 1535. 
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stating that it is when “all of the goodwill is attributable solely to the 
personal ability of the [individual].”264  Nevertheless, this case is all the 
rage for commentators to find this is a continuation of Howard and Martin 
Ice Cream.265 
Bross Trucking involved a bunch of companies owned by one guy–
Chester Bross.  Bross Trucking was one of those companies–and the 
trucking company’s main customers/suppliers were all family members of 
Chester Bross.  After Bross Trucking got into some trouble with the 
Department of Transportation after some audit and financial problems, 
Chester decided to shut down Bross Trucking, and have his three sons start 
a new trucking company, LWK Trucking.266  Although LWK expanded 
into areas that Bross Trucking hadn’t entered, it still continued the exact 
same business done by Bross Trucking, which involved using the same 
customers as Bross Trucking (which customers were all family owned).267  
The Service claimed that what had happened, in effect, was that Bross 
Trucking had distributed all of its intangible assets in Bross Trucking to 
Chester (a taxable event), and then Chester transferred those intangible 
assets to LWK (a gift tax event), both of which were not included in Bross 
Trucking or Chester’s tax returns for 2004, the year in which LWK was 
formed. 
Basing its reasoning on its analysis of Martin Ice Cream and Solomon, 
the court determined that Bross Trucking’s goodwill was “primarily owned 
by Mr. Bross personally, and the company could not transfer any corporate 
goodwill to Mr. Bross.”268 
The court in Bross made several interesting, but questionable points: 
1.  The court seemed to have two definitions of goodwill–the first was 
for corporate goodwill, as “the expectation of continued patronage,”269  
which the court seemed to limit to the value (or negative value) of the 
“Bross” name.270  However, the definition in the regulations includes “any 
other factor”271 that would contribute to an expectation of continued 
patronage, a much broader standard.  The second type of goodwill only 
applied to personal goodwill, and that was defined as personal relationships 
 
 264. Id. at 1533. 
 265. See, e.g., Risius, & Stumpf, Aaron, supra note 10. 
 266. Chester did consider having his three sons use Bross Trucking.  Opening Brief for Respondent 
at 30, Bross, 107 T.C.M. (CCH) 1528 (No. 7710-11).  However, on advice of counsel, Chester and his 
sons decided to form a new company.  Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1530. 
 267. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1530. 
 268. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1532. 
 269. Although goodwill is defined in section 1.197-2(b)(1) of the regulations, the court only used 
definitions from cases, such as Network Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 555 
(1993).  See Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1532. 
 270. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1533. 
 271. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(1). 
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between a shareholder and customers/vendors.272  The court then expanded 
personal goodwill to mean anything that was due to the personal ability of a 
shareholder.273  There are not two types of goodwill: there is only one, and 
the only question is who the goodwill belongs to. 
2.  The court made specious arguments about the relationship between 
Bross Trucking and LWK.  It noted that customers did not trust Bross 
Trucking and would not want to continue doing business with it,274 that 
LWK would want to hide the Bross logo from customers,275  that customers 
of Bross Trucking only did business with it due to having personal 
relationships with customers276 and “Bross Trucking’s customers had a 
choice of trucking options and chose to switch from Bross Trucking to 
LWK Trucking,”277 all the while pretending that the customers and Bross 
Trucking were not all in the same family. 
3.  The court had a very narrow version of the definition of a covenant 
not to compete, saying that it had to be a signed noncompete agreement.278  
However, the regulations are somewhat broader, saying that it can also be 
an arrangement that “has substantially the same effect as a covenant not to 
compete.”279  Since the arrangement was clearly that LWK would take over 
doing the work that Bross Trucking had been doing, and since the family 
owned all of these companies, the effect was the same as if Bross Trucking 
or Chester had signed a covenant not to compete. 
4.  Even if LWK did not receive any goodwill from Bross Trucking, it 
certainly received it from Chester.  The result would be that Chester would 
not pay taxes on a distribution from Bross Trucking, but he certainly should 
have accounted for the gift of the personal goodwill to his sons, which the 
court did not discuss. 
Although this case does not really add anything to the personal 
goodwill discussion and, in fact, it may only muddy the waters, it has had 
the effect of lawyers and accountants discussing personal goodwill more 







 272. Bross, 107 T.C.M (CCH) at 1533. 
 273. See id. (“A company does not have any corporate goodwill when all of the goodwill is 
attributable solely to the personal ability of an employee.”). 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 1535. 
 278. Id. at 1534. 
 279. I.R.C. § 179(d)(1)(E). 
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V. WHAT IS A SELLER TO DO?  ADDING A LEGISLATIVE FIX 
 
A comprehensive look at the details in the personal goodwill cases 
show that adherence to one definitive list that decides whether goodwill is 
personal or belongs to the company does not work, and attorneys and 
accountants who rely on it are not standing on solid ground.  Some cases 
emphasize non-compete agreements with the buyer (= personal goodwill), 
or employment agreements with the seller (≠ personal goodwill), others 
emphasize personal relationships pre-dating the start of the company.  But 
one thread that does run through all of these cases: when in the process did 
the buyer and seller first talk about personal goodwill?  If the parties talk 
about it only after negotiations on price have concluded, including only 
mentioning it once litigation has started, courts will not call it personal 
goodwill.  If the parties never talk about it but have talked about things that 
include facts that support a goodwill designation (e.g., signing the 
agreement individually or purchase price in drafts shows an allocation for 
an individual), a goodwill designation sometimes holds.280  A second factor 
that runs through the cases is how the individual judge deciding the case 
feels about the litigants, their arguments, or personal goodwill.  Query 
whether the idea of personal goodwill would ever have taken a foothold if 
the judge in Martin Ice Cream had not been really interested in that topic to 
begin with.281 
A seller’s use of personal goodwill should not be dependent on their 
knowing about it before they start to negotiate a deal, or whether they were 
lucky enough to not have introduced it into the conversation after the fact.  
Sellers should have some assurance that a contractually agreed-on 
allocation, supported by statutorily defined back-up data, will be respected 
by the Service, and not be subject to second guessing or to looking behind 
the contract.  In the cases since Martin Ice Cream, the futures of the 
taxpayers rose and fell on the timing that they asked about using personal 
goodwill as an allocation of part of their purchase price, their foolhardy 
choice to consider tax savings as a reason for considering the use of 
personal goodwill and how they chose to memorialize their work in their 
business before even thinking about selling.  The outcomes have sometimes 
matched the reality of the business, but other times, not so much. 
Just as section 197 was enacted to, among other reasons, bring 
certainty to taxpayers in the amortization of their intangible assets, so too 
can legislation bring certainty to taxpayers (and the Service) in the 
allocation of goodwill in a sale of assets.  Simple legislation could be 
crafted to allow this allocation, with the taxpayer instructed to provide the 
 
 280. Martin Ice Cream is the best example of this: it had more factors weighing in the direction of 
personal goodwill, without Arnold Strassberg ever having thought about it. 
 281. Martin Ice Cream v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189, 202 (T.C. 1998). 
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backup that a synthesis of the factors in the personal goodwill cases now 
require.  These factors are 
1.  Appraisal of the personal goodwill (with certifications similar to 
those required by appraisals for gift and estate taxes, using the language 
from section 170). 
2.  A covenant not to compete and/or consultant agreement between 
the buyer and the individual shareholder of the seller (to make the transfer 
of the personal goodwill effective). 
3.  Attestation that the shareholder has not transferred any intangible 
assets that would give rise to the corporation owning the goodwill (e.g., no 
employment agreement or covenant not to compete with the shareholder’s 
own corporation). 
4.  Agreement for sale of assets to be signed by both the corporation 
and the individual, with the allocation spelled out in the contract. 
The appraisal by a certified appraiser would take care of any trumped 
up personal goodwill claims.  This safe harbor for a personal goodwill 
allocation would also allow sellers the opportunity to negotiate for 
allocating part of the purchase price to personal goodwill without worrying 
that their record will show that negotiations didn’t start early enough.  
Having a specific statute for an allocation of personal goodwill will also 
serve to allow all sellers the opportunity to use this allocation if it fits their 
circumstances, rather than limiting it to the sellers with sophisticated 




Martin Ice Cream and the cases that followed has meant that it is a 
crap shoot for a seller of assets allocating part of the purchase price to an 
individual’s personal goodwill rather than to the corporation.  Tax 
consequences should not depend on the whims of any particular judge, or at 
what point in the negotiations the parties discussed allocation of goodwill.  
Contracts with tax allocations supported by appropriate backup entered into 
between two willing participants shouldn’t be so easily discarded.  As the 
allocation of part of a purchase price of assets to the personal goodwill of a 
shareholder is allowed under current law, its usage should be standard and 
predictable, which it currently is not.  Although commentators have 
developed a list of criteria for the availability of an allocation to personal 
goodwill, case law shows that the availability is more arbitrary than 
commentators say.  A legislative fix to establish standards for its usage 
would allow predictability and reduce uncertainty for taxpayers, as well as 
reduce the costs of litigation for this unsettled area of law. 
 
 
 
